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Abstract
We show how to use optimal control theory to derive optimal time-consistent Markov-perfect
government policies in nonlinear dynamic general equilibrium models, extending the result of
Cohen and Michel (1988) for models with quadratic objective functions and linear dynamics. We
replace private agents’ costates by ﬂexible functions of current states in the government’s
maximization problem. The functions are veriﬁed in equilibrium to an arbitrarily close degree of
approximation. They can be found numerically by perturbation or projection methods. We use a
stochastic model of optimal public spending to illustrate the technique.
JEL classiﬁcation: E61, E62, C63
Bank classiﬁcation: Fiscal policy; Monetary policy framework
Résumé
Les auteurs montrent comment la théorie du contrôle optimal permet d’élaborer des politiques
optimales temporellement cohérentes en équilibre markovien parfait à l’aide de modèles
d’équilibre général dynamiques non linéaires, dans la lignée des résultats obtenus par Cohen et
Michel (1988) à partir de modèles dynamiques linéaires où la fonction-objectif est de forme
quadratique. Les multiplicateurs de Lagrange du problème de maximisation des agents du secteur
privé sont remplacés par des fonctions ﬂexibles des variables d’état de la période en cours dans le
problème de maximisation du bien-être collectif. À l’équilibre, ces fonctions se vériﬁent jusqu’à
un degré quelconque d’approximation. Elles peuvent être résolues numériquement à l’aide de
méthodes de perturbation ou de projection. Les auteurs illustrent l’emploi de leur technique au
moyen d’un modèle stochastique formalisant le niveau optimal des dépenses publiques.
Classiﬁcation JEL : E61, E62, C63
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Politique budgétaire; Cadre de la politique monétaire1 Introduction
AnappealingfeatureofsolvingRamsey(1927)problemstoderiveoptimalsecond-
best government policies in dynamic general equilibrium models is their relative
analytical tractability. It is often possible to use the so-called primal approach, in
which private agents’ ﬁrst order conditions and budget constraints are combined
to derive an implementability constraint,1 allowing prices and policy variables to
be substituted out of the problem. The choice variables of the optimal policy prob-
lem are the allocations themselves. Prices and policies that support the optimal
allocations can be derived once the allocations themselves are known. Using the
primal approach leads to equations in which expected future allocations have an
inﬂuence on agents’ current behavior. Therefore, optimal policies derived in this
manner are generally time-inconsistent.2 The government must be able to commit
credibly to its announced policies. Otherwise, it will optimally revise them as
time goes by, in which case its announced policies will not be believed by private
agents.
It is often interesting to compare the optimal allocations under credible pre-
commitment by the government to optimal allocations where this precommitment
is not possible, possibly for institutional or political reasons. In the latter case, dy-
namicprogramming canbeusedtocomputeoptimal Markov-perfectstrategiesfor
the government. In special cases, the envelope theorem can be used to eliminate
the government’s value function from the system of equations.3 Alternatively,
it is possible to linearize the laws of motion of the economy and use quadratic
approximations to agents’ preferences, so that the value function takes a known
form.4 This approach may be less than satisfactory in the presence of impor-
tant nonlinearities. In addition, using linear-quadratic approximations may lead
1See Chari and Kehoe (1999) for a detailed discussion.
2Solutions to the Ramsey problem can be made time-consistent in special cases. The most
well-known case is Lucas and Stokey (1983).
3See Judd (1998, section16.9), Azzimonti-Renzo, Sarte and Soares (2003), Klein, Krusell and
R´ ıos-Rull (2004) and Ortigueira (2004) for examples.
4See Ambler and Paquet (1996, 1997) and Ambler and Cardia (1997)
1to misleading welfare comparisons if the deterministic steady state is not a Pareto
optimum.5 An approximation to the government’s value function can be found
by discretizing the model’s state space, but this approach suffers from a curse of
dimensionality: it is computationally burdensome with more than a small number
of state variables. It would be useful to have an alternative general methodology
for analyzing optimal time-consistent Markovian policies.
In this paper, we show how to use optimal control theory to derive time-
consistent Markovian government policies in nonlinear dynamic general equilib-
rium models, extending the insight of Cohen and Michel (1988). They showed
that in linear-quadratic environments time-consistent policies compatible with
Markov-perfect equilibria can be found using optimal control theory by impos-
ing a linear relationship between predetermined state variables and the costate
variables from private agents’ maximization problems.6 We show that by restrict-
ing private agents’ costates to be a nonlinear function of current predetermined
state variables, the optimal control problem of the government becomes recur-
sive (in a sense to be deﬁned below), whereas in the Ramsey problem it typi-
cally is not. The nonlinear function is veriﬁed in equilibrium to an arbitrarily
close degree of approximation. Projection methods or perturbation methods can
be used to approximate the function.7 The equilibria found using this approach
are Markov-perfect since the government’s policy function is time invariant and
depends only on the current state of the economy.8 The technique can be used
to ﬁnd Markov-perfect equilibria in stochastic models. Many previous treatments
5See Kim and Kim (2003). See Woodford (2003, chapter 6) for conditions under which the
linear-quadratic approach is justiﬁed.
6Their methodology was utilized to analyze optimal government policies by a number of re-
searchers. See Currie and Levine (1993), Oudiz and Sachs (1985) and Miller and Salmon (1985)
for examples.
7See Judd (1998), McGrattan (1999), and Aruoba, Fernndez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ram´ ırez
(2004). Projection methods can have better global properties than perturbation methods around a
particular equilibrium point.
8See Bernheim and Ray (1989) and Maskin and Tirole (1993) for rigorous treatments of the
concept of Markov-perfect equilibrium. We exclude more complex strategies that are history-
dependent. For examples of the latter, see Benhabib and Rustichini (1997), Benhabib, Rustichini
and Velasco (1996), Benhabib and Velasco (1996) and Chari and Kehoe (1990).
2of optimal time-consistent government policies have been limited to deterministic
models.9
The paper is structured as follows. In the following section, we develop an
abstract model of the interaction between a representative private agent and a gov-
ernment. In section three, we review how the time consistency problem arises by
analyzing a Ramsey problem applied to the abstract model. In the fourth section,
we show how to extend Cohen and Michel’s (1988) approach to nonlinear mod-
els. In section ﬁve, we formally demonstrate the recursivity of the government’s
problem. In the sixth section, we discuss how to calculate a numerical solution to
the optimal control problem. In the seventh section, we present a simple model
of public spending in order to illustrate the technique. Conclusions are in section
eight.
2 The Model
The economy consists of a representative household,10 a representative competi-
tive ﬁrm, and a government.11 The household has an inﬁnite planning horizon and
maximizes its utility taking as given all relative prices and the government’s pol-
icy rule. The government chooses its policies to maximize social welfare, which
in this framework leads it to maximize the utility of the representative household,
subject to the ﬁrst order conditions of the household.
9Papers include Klein, Krusell and R´ ıos-Rull (2004) and Ortigueira (2004).
10The approach here could be extended to models of heterogeneous agents, but the notation
would be cumbersome. See R´ ıos-Rull (1995) for a good introduction to heterogeneous agent
models.
11Although the analysis is framed in terms of optimal government policy, it is clear that it could
be used to derive time-consistent feedback rules in any dynamic game with a Stackelberg leader.
32.1 The Household






where zt is a vector of exogenous state variables of dimension ηzx1, gt is a ηgx1
vector of government policy variables, st is a ηsx1 vector of endogenous state
variables under the control of the individual household, St is a ηsx1 vector of en-
dogenous aggregate state variables, which are the aggregate counterparts of st, dt
is a ηdx1 vector of the household’s control variables, Dt is a ηdx1 vector of the ag-
gregate counterparts of dt, and Et denotes mathematical expectations conditional
on information available at time t. The household chooses {dt+i}∞
i=0 in order to
maximize its utility, subject to the following set of constraints: the law of motion
of the household’s state variables,
st+1 = b(zt,gt,St,st,Dt,dt); (2)
the law of motion of the aggregate state variables,
St+1 = B (zt,gt,St,Dt,); (3)
the feedback rule for the aggregate control variables,
Dt = D(zt,gt,St); (4)
and the feedback rule for the government’s policy variables,
gt = g (zt,St). (5)
The assumption that the law of motion for the household’s state variables is an
explicit function for st+1 is not innocuous. If there were an implicit relationship
between st+1 and current states and controls, the household’s ﬁrst order condition
12The notation is patterned after Hansen and Prescott (1995).
4for the choice of dt would depend on the future state of the economy. Solving
for the private sector’s control variables as an explicit function of current state
variables and costate variables as in (10) below would no longer be possible. The
solution to this problem leads to a feedback rule of the form
dt = d(zt,gt,St,st). (6)
As equilibrium conditions, we will impose aggregate consistency conditions. The
laws of motion for St and st must satisfy
b(zt,gt,St,St,Dt,Dt) = B (zt,gt,St,Dt,), (7)
and the feedback rules for Dt and dt must be consistent:
d(zt,gt,St,St) = D(zt,gt,St). (8)













The household chooses {dt+i,st+i+1,λt+i}∞
i=0. The ﬁrst order conditions with


















λt : st+1 = b(zt,gt,St,st,Dt,dt).
When we impose the aggregate consistency constraints, the ﬁrst order con-
dition with respect to dt gives a set of ηdx1 static equations. We assume that
it is possible to solve the equations explicitly for Dt as a function of states and
costates:
Dt = ˜ D(zt,gt,St,λt). (10)
53 A Ramsey Problem
Models like the one in the previous section are often used to set up Ramsey (1927)
problems, in which the government maximizes social welfare subject to the ﬁrst
order conditions of private agents. In the present context, this leads to the follow-






































where the household’s control variables and state variables are replaced by their
aggregate per capita counterparts. The government maximizes the representative
agent’s utility. This assumption is not necessary but it simpliﬁes the analysis.
The government maximizes the Lagrangian with respect to its control variables
{gt+i}∞
i=0, the aggregate equivalents of the private sector’s control variables, and
the Lagrange multipliers.
The force of the time inconsistency argument is made clear if we consider the














































   
(12)
13As noted in the introduction, it is often possible to simplify the government’s Lagrangian
using the primal approach. This approach is not applicable to the highly abstract model presented
here.
6The term in π3
t gives the inﬂuence of future policy on the current behavior of
households, via its effect on the forward-looking costate variables λt. If we allow































Bygones are bygones. The effect of the government’s controls at time t+1 on the
household’s actions at time t no longer appears. Even in the absence of unantici-
pated shocks, the government will in general revise its optimal plans.
Sincethevaluesoftheprivatesector’scostatevariablesλt arenotpinneddown





The private sector’s costates give the marginal value of the state variables to the
representative agent’s utility. Since the government’s welfare function is just the
utility function of the representative agent, a necessary condition to maximize
welfare is that the contribution of a marginal change in these costates to welfare
be zero. The future values of π3
t+i, i > 0 are determined by the endogenous
dynamics of the economy. After time t, they will only be zero by coincidence.
However, if the government is allowed to reoptimize at time t + i, with i > 0, it




In so doing, its optimal strategy changes. Time inconsistency arises here because
the government’s problem is not recursive in the sense of Sargent (1987, p.19). An
agent’s problem is recursive if its control variables dated t inﬂuence states dated
t + 1 and later and inﬂuence returns dated t and later. The household’s current
actions depend partly on its expectations of future government actions. In the
Ramsey problem, the government’s announced or future policies inﬂuence private
agents’ current behavior and therefore the current return via the function r(·).
74 Time-Consistent Control
Cohen and Michel (1988) studied a linear model with a single state variable and a
quadratic objective function. They imposed a linear relationship between the pre-
determined state variable and the representative private agent’s costate variable.
They showed that the relationship is veriﬁed in equilibrium. Imposing it ties the
government’s hands. It is not allowed to choose its policy in order to set the initial
marginal values of the costates equal to zero. If allowed to reoptimize, it is not
tempted to change its policy in order to bring the marginal values of the costates
back to zero.
This insight can be extended to nonlinear models as follows. In the present
context, we can replace the last two terms associated with the π3











Note that these terms include the value in time t + 1 of the private agent’s costate
variables. As shown below, replacing these terms with a function of the model’s
state variables can be used with projection methods or perturbation methods to
solve the model numerically, once we do the same thing for analogous terms from
the government’s ﬁrst order conditions.14 A byproduct of this is that λt, the vec-




This is just the nonlinear equivalent of the constraint imposed by Cohen and
Michel (1988). It makes the government’s problem recursive, as shown in the
next section.
14See Judd (1998). The substitution is identical to that proposed by Den Haan and Marcet
(1990). Their parameterized expectations solution technique is an example from the class of pro-
jection methods.
85 The Recursivity of the Government’s Problem
We now assume that the government maximizes the utility of the representative
private agent, as in the Ramsey problem described above, subject to the additional
constraint given by (15). We can then show that the government’s problem be-
comes recursive. We can write it as a dynamic programming problem in which
the period-t return function does not depend on the future values of the govern-
ment’s controls.
We need one further assumption to demonstrate recursivity. We assume that
the set of ηg equations associated with the π2
t constraint, once λt is replaced by
−φ(zt,St), can be solved out to ﬁnd an explicit set of feedback rules for Dt which
in equilibrium is just equation (4). Then, we can show the following:
Proposition: Subject to the constraint (15), the government’s maximization prob-
lem is recursive.
Proof: Substituting in the constraint, we have the following expression for the dif-
ference between the government’s Lagrangian at time t and the discounted value






















The one-period return function of the government does not depend directly or
indirectly on gt+1, since we suppose that Dt can be written as a function of only
current state variables and gt. The government’s value function can be written as
V
g











The maximization is subject to the law of motion of the aggregate state vari-
ables St, and to the ﬁrst order conditions for the household’s choice of its con-
trols dt, with the household’s Lagrange multipliers λt substituted out using the
constraint given in (15). Note that the government’s problem becomes recursive
partly because one of the underlying assumptions of this approach is that there is a
time-invariant feedback rule for Dt which depends only on the current state of the
economy. This leads to a feedback rule for the government compatible with (5)
that depends only on the current state of the economy. It is as if the current gov-
ernment derives its optimal policy using dynamic programming techniques, under
the assumption that all future governments will derive their optimal policies in the
same way.15
































Because of the presence of the future value of the household’s constraint λt+1, the
government’s problem fails to be recursive.
6 Numerical Solution
Using the Lagrangian in (11) above, after substituting out λt and eliminating the
third constraint, the ﬁrst order conditions for the government’s problem can be
15One interpretation of optimal time-consistent policy is that the current government is playing


























































































Several remarks are in order. First, the government’s ﬁrst order equations con-
stitute a time-autonomous set of nonlinear difference equations.16 Second, if the
system is saddle-point stable, the initial conditions of the government’s costate
variables are those that place the system on the multi-dimensional convergent
manifold of the system. The initial conditions of the costates therefore depend
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= ψ (zt,St). (21)
16In the Ramsey problem, the optimality condition that the Lagrange multipliers related to pri-
vate agent’s costates be equal to zero at the moment the government optimizes, independently
of the state of the economy, means that the resulting dynamical equation system is not time-
autonomous. Its optimal policy is not a time-invariant function of the state of the economy, but
rather depends on when it optimized. This is another way of interpreting the time inconsistency of




t = −ψ (zt,St)
′ . (22)
Third, if the government’s costates are functions of the current state of the econ-
omy, its policy variables are also implicit functions of the current state of the
economy. The government’s behavior is memoryless, and a solution to the dy-
namic equations that also satisﬁes the government’s and private agents’ optimality
conditions is a Markov-perfect equilibrium. Fourth, the government’s and private
agents’ Euler conditions will hold if equations (14) and (21) are satisﬁed. Fifth,
for given parameterizations of the φ(·) and ψ(·) functions, the dynamical sys-
tem becomes recursive and can easily be solved numerically by iterating forward.
Sixth, we do not have a general proof of existence or uniqueness of our Markov-
perfect equilibrium. Krusell and Smith (2003) showed in a similar context that
there is an indeterminacy of Markov-perfect equilibria. However, the multiple
equilibria are associated with discontinuous decision rules. If we parameterize
the ψ(·) function as a continuous function of the economy’s state variables, then
implicitly the government’s policy rules are also continuous functions of the econ-
omy’s state variables: Klein, Krusell and R´ ıos-Rull (2004) argue that imposing a
differentiability requirement on the government’s policy function is an important
“reﬁnement tool” for reducing the number of Markov-perfect equilibria. In some
applications, such as the application presented below, proof of unicity will be
straightforward.
The use of projection or perturbation methods in conjunction with control the-
ory allows for an arbitrarily close approximation to the exact solution to the un-
derlying problem. To illustrate how to solve the model numerically, we use a vari-
ation of the methodology described by Den Haan and Marcet (1990) and Marcet
and Lorenzoni (1999). This method falls into the class of projection methods, and
uses Monte Carlo methods to solve for the unknown parameters of the functional
equations. The model can be simulated using the following steps:
• Parameterize the φ(·) and ψ(·) functions using ﬂexible functional forms
such as polynomials or orthogonalized polynomials.
12• Initialize the parameter values of these functions.
• For given parameter values of the φ(·) and ψ(·) functions, simulate the
model for a large number of time periods. Aside from the laws of mo-
tion for St and zt, all of the equations that need to be solved are static. The
laws of motion themselves are recursive.
• Estimate the parameters in the φ(·) and ψ(·) functions by nonlinear regres-
sion, with the dependent variables being the series generated by numerical
simulation, in order to minimize the sum of squared forecasting errors.
• Repeat the simulation and estimation steps until the change in the parame-
ters of the expectations functions between iterations is sufﬁciently small.
7 Application
We apply the techniques developed in above to a simple model of optimal public
spending. The utility function of the representative private agent depends on both
private consumption spending and on government purchases. The government
chooses public spending in order to maximize social welfare, which is just the
expected utility of the representative private agent, It ﬁnances this spending via a
proportional tax on total income.





i {ln(ct+i) + µln(gt+i)}, (23)
where ct is private consumption and gt is public spending. The private agent holds
the capital stock and rents it to ﬁrms. Its period budget constraint is given by
(1 − τt)(wt + (rt − δ)kt) + kt = ct + kt+1, (24)
where wt is the competitive real wage, rt is the competitive real rental rate of
capital, kt is capital held by the individual, and τt is the rate of taxation on total
13income. The time endowment of the individual is normalized to equal one, so that
before-tax labor income is just given by wt.
The aggregate production function is given by
yt = atkt
α, (25)
where yt is GDP. The law of motion for at is given by
ln(at) = ρln(at−1) + εt, (26)
where εt is a white noise shock with variance σ2
ε.
The government ﬁnances public investment via a proportional tax on total in-
come. We rule out lump sum taxation in order to make the policy problem one
of ﬁnding the second-best outcome, which leads to a distinction between time-
consistent policies and time inconsistent policies. The government’s budget is
balanced in each period, so that
τt (wt + (rt − δ)kt) = gt. (27)




λt = βEt (λt+1 [1 + (1 − τt+1)(rt+1 − δ)]), (29)
kt+1 = (1 − τt)yt + (1 − δ)kt − ct (30)
Thegovernment’s budget constraintcanbeusedto substituteoutpublic spend-
ing, so that τt is the only policy instrument. Under commitment, the government’s
maximization problem can be expressed as follows, after substituting out the rep-







ln(ct+i) + µln(τt+i) + µln(yt+i − δkt+i)
+π
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where yt and at are deﬁned respectively in (25) and (26).
It is straightforward to verify numerically whether this system of equations is
saddlepoint stable, using a ﬁrst-order approximation of the equilibrium conditions
around its deterministic steady state. If local stability is satisﬁed, which is the case
forourbase-casecalibrationofthemodelandforawiderangeofparametervalues
used for sensitivity analysis, then a solution that converges to the deterministic
steady state is the unique solution that satisﬁes the transversality conditions for
the optimization problems by private agents and the government.
157.1 Discretion
To ﬁnd the time-consistent optimal policy under discretion (the absence of an
ability to precommit), we replace the private agent’s Euler equation by
1
ct
− φ(at,kt) = 0,
where φ(at,kt) is a function to be approximated. After using the government’s







ln(ct+i) + µln(τt+i) + µln(yt+i − δkt+i)
+π
1
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We deﬁne equilibrium in our model with discretion as follows. The following
equations are satisﬁed in equilibrium:
ln(at) = ρln(at−1) + εt, (32)
16π
1


















kt+1 = (1 − τt)yt + (1 − δ(1 − τt))kt − ct, (38)
and where, for a suitably-deﬁned sample of artiﬁcial data based on simulating this
system of equations and suitable parameterizations of the φ(·) and ψ(·) functions,
we have:





[1 + (1 − τt+1)(rt+1 − δ)]
 
, (39)


























where the   Et operator refers to sample means. Equation (39) ensures that the
representative private agent’s Euler equation is satisﬁed to an arbitrary degree
of accuracy. Equation (40) ensures that the government’s Euler equation for the
optimal choice of the capital stock is satisﬁed to an arbitrary degree of accuracy.
For given initial conditions (values of at−1 and kt) and given parameterizations
of the φ(·) and ψ(·) functions, the system of equations to solve for the economy’s
equilibrium for any period t is recursive. As long as the φ(·) function is parame-
terized to avoid zero values, a solution exists. It can be shown that the solutions
for output, aggregate consumption and the tax rate are unique.
It is clear that private agents’ consumption (and hence savings) policies and
the government’s taxation policy are dependent only on the current values of the
17technology shock at and the capital stock kt. In this sense, the equilibrium is a
Markov-perfect equilibrium.
The substitution of the private agent’s and government’s Euler equations us-
ing the φ(·) and ψ(·) functions renders the dynamical equation system completely
recursive for given values of the parameters used to approximate the functions.
Local stability of this system for suitable approximations of φ(·) and ψ(·) means
that agents’ ﬁrst order conditions hold and that transversality conditions are satis-
ﬁed.17
7.2 Results
The parameter values used to simulate the model are summarized in Table 1. They
are standard values used in the real business cycle literature. To solve the time-
consistent and Ramsey problems, we use a version of the parameterized expecta-
tions algorithm (PEA) of Den Haan and Marcet (1990) and Marcet and Lorenzoni
(1999). In both cases, we need to ﬁnd two interpolating functions (one for each
Euler equation). We describe in detail the methodology for the time-consistent
problem. There are two state variables, kt and at, so that the two interpolating
functions, φ and ψ, should be functions of both kt and at, and verify
1
ct
− φ(at,kt) = 0 and π
1
t − ψ (at,kt) = 0.
We derive results for both ﬁrst-order and second-order polynomial approxima-
tions. The ﬁrst order approximations are given by:
φ(·) = exp(β1 + β2 ln(Kt) + β3 ln(at));
ψ(·) = exp(θ1 + θ2 ln(Kt) + θ3 ln(at)).
The second-order approximations are given by:
φ(·) = exp(β1+β2 ln(Kt)+β3 ln(at)+β4(ln(Kt))
2+β5(ln(at))
2+β6 ln(Kt)ln(at));
17A proof of the unicity of the Markov-perfect equilibrium for this application is available on
request.
18ψ(·) = exp(θ1+θ2 ln(Kt)+θ3 ln(at)+θ4(ln(Kt))
2+θ5(ln(at))
2+θ6 ln(Kt)ln(at)).
Below, we report results for DM-tests (see Den Haan and Marcet, 1994) of the
adequacy of the approximations. We use nonlinear least squares to estimate the
parameters of the polynomials, and use a dampening coefﬁcient 0 < λ ≤ 1 to
foster convergence. We iterate on:
ψs+1 = (1 − λ)ψs + λ ˆ ψ,
where ˆ ψ gives the current vector of estimates of the parameters of the approxima-
tions. As starting values, we use the steady-state (and the decision rules) of the
commitment solution. The estimated parameters of the PEA functions are given
in Table 2 below.
Figure 1 displays impulse-response functions (for the ﬁrst-order PEA func-
tions) in response to a one-standard-deviation shock to technology. The horizontal
axis measures the number of quarters after the shock and the vertical axis mea-
sures the deviations in logs from the steady state. Following a positive shock
to technology, output increases as does consumption. The tax rate initially falls,
so that the initial impact on public spending is proportionately lower than the
impact on private consumption spending. The gradual accumulation of capital
in response to the shock imparts a hump-shaped response of both private con-
sumption spending and public spending. These two variables peak just before the
capital stock reaches its maximum level, and then the capital stock, public spend-
ing, private consumption, and output all converge to their steady state levels from
above. The response of the tax rate is non-monotonic. After an initial drop, the
tax rate surpasses its steady-state value shortly after the capital stock peaks, and
then converges to the steady state from above.
As explained before, the form of the PEA is critical. In this context, we pro-
ceed in two steps. First, we compare deterministic simulations using the ﬁrst-
order and second-order PEA. Second, we develop the adequacy test, as suggested
by Den Haan and Marcet (1994) in a multivariate setting. Figure 2 reports the de-
terministic paths of variables of interest under the optimal (discretionary) policy,
19assuming an initial capital stock that is below its steady-state level. The dotted
lines represent the results from the second-order approximation. A visual inspec-
tion shows that the difference in polynomial orders matters only slightly in this
application.
The PEA functions are approximated in order to satisfy orthogonality condi-
tions. If the approximations are adequate, the realized future values of the nonlin-
ear functions of future variables to which the conditional expectations operator is
applied should be unpredictable given information available at time t. This is the
rationale of the DM test proposed by Den Haan and Marcet (1994). To implement
the test, we regressed the realized time t + 1 forecast errors of the PEA functions
on a constant, the capital stock, and the technology shock, both measured at time
t. We also tried regressions in which we added four lags of the capital stock and
four lags of the technology shock. The results were robust to the speciﬁcation of
the regressions.
To reduce the probability of a type I error (rejection of the null when it is true:
see explanations in Heer and Maussner, page 502), we follow the procedure of
Den Haan and Marcet (1994). For a given sequence of shocks, we ﬁrst compute
the two approximate solutions φ and ψ for a large T (T = 5000). Second we
use this solution and draw a new sequence of shocks such that the corresponding
sample size, T1 is smaller than T. After computing the time path of the variables
of interest, the DM statistic can be calculated for these observations. Then, this
procedure is repeated very often and we can compute the percentage of the DM-
statistics that are below the lower or above the upper 2.5 percent critical values of
the χ2(m) distribution.
In the benchmark case and for ﬁrst-degree approximations of the PEA func-
tions, the DM-statistic was 8.6746, which leads us to accept (at a ﬁve-percent
level) the the null hypothesis that the forecast errors are unpredictable based on the
time t information set. The number of DM-statistics (out of 500) below (above)
the 2.5th and 97.5th percentile of a χ2 distribution with 6 degrees of freedom was
close to the theoretical ﬁve percent.
20Given that the ﬁrst-order PEA functions are adequate, we compared the deter-
ministic convergence to the steady-state under commitment and discretion. The
solid lines in Figure 3 reproduce the time paths from Figure 2 and illustrate the
convergence to the steady state of the model under optimal discretionary (time
consistent) policy. The dotted lines illustrate the convergence of the model under
optimal policy with commitment. The steady states are different under the two
types of optimal policy, and the behavior of consumption, public expenditures and
the tax rate is substantially different when the government ﬁrst optimizes. Overall,
taxes are higher under commitment but this leads to higher public expenditures,
which increases the conditional welfare of the representative agent.
Finally, to assess the differences between the commitment and discretion solu-
tions, wecalculatedconditionalwelfare. Thisismeasuredattimet(whenthegov-
ernment optimizes) for the same initial conditions (same technology level, same
level of the capital stock, which is below its deterministic steady-state level under
either discretion or commitment). Table 3 gives values for conditional welfare.
8 Conclusions
The methodology proposed in this paper is quite general. It leads to systems of
dynamical equations which can easily be simulated with available computer tech-
nology and relatively parsimonious numerical solutions using projection or per-
turbation techniques. Deriving time-consistent government policies using these
methods is conceptually as straightforward as solving Ramsey problems. The
technique should allow researchers to do normative analysis, comparing the lev-
els of welfare attainable with and without precommitment by the government.
It should also be useful for positive analysis, for example comparing the predic-
tions of a given model for comovements between government policy variables and
other macroeconomic aggregates with and without precommitment. As suggested
by Judd (1998), with current advances in computer technology it should become
more and more common to use numerical methods to advance our understanding
21of economic theory.
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Table 2: Model Parameter Estimates
Parameter β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 β6
φ(·) 0.8877 -0.4796 -0.4699 - - -
φ(·) 0.8903 -0.4827 -0.5348 0.011 -0.2480 0.0374
Parameter θ1 θ2 θ3 θ4 θ5 θ6
ψ(·) 1.0804 -0.5472 -0.4812 - - -
ψ(·) 0.8988 -0.3740 -0.8939 -0.0403 -0.2375 0.1886
Table 3: Conditional Welfare
commitment -17.4792
discretion, 1st-order approximation -17.7404
discretion, 2nd-order approximation -17.7280
25Figure 1: Impulse-response functions after a technology shock







































26Figure 2: First-order versus Second-order PEA
























27Figure 3: First-order PEA versus Commitment
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